The New Spies Read online

  The background against which all these reforms are taking place has changed dramatically in the past few years and continues to evolve. At the end of the Cold War there was general agreement about the nature of the threats that posed a challenge to the intelligence community; drugs, organised crime, proliferation of conventional and unconventional weapons, as well as the possibility of renewed threats posed by the former Soviet Union.

  That early assessment has been reinforced by developments in the past two years that have been well reported in the media, from the continued fighting in Bosnia to the attack on the Japanese subway using Sarin, a biological weapon.

  The fact that ethnic tension is expected to produce more Bosnias is hardly surprising. But the Sarin attack, despite plenty of evidence that could have provided warning, was a complete surprise to the intelligence community. There had been a test run using Sarin on June 27, 1994 when, in the middle of the night, people in the town of Matsumoto on the edge of the Japanese Alps complained of feeling ill. That night 150 people were taken to hospital with severe vomiting and many unable to walk. Seven people died and some are still in hospital.

  Early investigations by the local police suggested that Yoshiyuka Kono, a local resident, had been mixing fertiliser in his back garden and accidentally released a poison gas cloud over the town. He first raised the alarm and was subsequently arrested by the police. A week later, residents of a small village some distance from Matsumoto also complained of feeling ill. Their symptoms were similar to those in the first attack but nobody died and everyone recovered after treatment.

  Publicly, the Japanese maintained that the problem was a matter for the local police. Privately, however, the security forces launched an intensive investigation. Soil samples taken at the time revealed that the poison was Sarin. A careful study of the weather in the area suggested that the timing of the Sarin release had been carefully judged. At that time of year the weather is normally humid and wet, conditions that are not suitable for Sarin, which swiftly degrades in moisture. On June 26 there was an unusual two-day change in the weather that produced hot, dry conditions with a mild breeze — perfect for spreading airborne Sarin.

  The second release in the small village appeared to be a test to see just how quickly Sarin degrades in wet conditions. Japanese security forces concluded that even though there had been no claim of responsibility, the attack was a trial run by a terrorist organisation.

  Yet, despite all the evidence, there was no sharing of the available intelligence by the Japanese with their allies and when the subway attack occurred in Tokyo in March 1995 there was no warning and no available intelligence to allow the policy-makers to respond effectively to what appeared to be a totally new threat.

  Although that attack had been orchestrated by a fringe cult, some intelligence agencies were beginning to understand the real and present danger posed by biological weapons proliferation. At the same time as the Japanese security forces were investigating the first uses of Sarin, so American and British intelligence had launched a major covert effort to try to prevent the Libyans from acquiring their own biological weapons capability.

  Towards the end of 1994, the CIA learned that the Libyans were trying to recruit one of two men who had secretly developed a new range of biological weapons for the apartheid government in South Africa during the 1980s. The Libyans had secretly offered the man huge sums of money to move from South Africa to Tripoli to help Colonel Gadaffi develop his own biological weapons.

  The fact that South Africa had a BW capability was one of the best intelligence secrets of recent years. In fact South Africa’s Ministry of Defence had run a covert programme not just to develop the weapons but to use them to assassinate opposition leaders and to kill guerrillas operating in Angola and Namibia. When Nelson Mandela was elected President of South Africa, both the British and American governments had put pressure on him to try to get the BW programme shut down.

  Production of BW had stopped but the military had refused to destroy the research, which meant that the programme could be started up at any time. Now the Libyans were trying to acquire that knowledge, which would have meant Gadaffi developing a BW capability within two years.

  Both the CIA and MI6 mounted a major covert operation to stop the Libyans, which has been partly successful. The South African scientist has been persuaded to stay in his home country and the Libyans have so far been prevented from recruiting anyone else who might help kick-start their BW programme. But it will be only a matter of time before that programme does take off.

  The fact that pressure from the British and Americans failed to persuade Mandela to force his own military to destroy all records of the BW programme is a graphic illustration of the limits of intelligence in the post-Cold War period. President Clinton was reluctant to go public in his condemnation of Mandela in case he undermined his fragile political base.

  Exactly the same considerations have prevented the Americans from forcing President Yeltsin to stop the Russian BW programme which, despite its exposure in the first edition of The New Spies, is continuing at full strength. When The New Spies was first published, the Russians protested to both the British and Americans about the information they claimed had been supplied to me. There was much hand-wringing and buck-passing but the quiet pressure on Yeltsin continued.

  Over the past two years, there has been ample intelligence that the Russian military continue to refine their BW programme and to devote increasingly scarce resources to ensure its effective operation. It was not until the Clinton-Yeltsin summit of May 1995 that the Russians finally agreed to allow some access to the military installations suspected of housing the BW facilities.

  Such clear evidence of weak political influence over the military has been one of the reasons for growing caution in the Western intelligence community about the future course Russia is expected to take. There are also worries about the current direction of the Russian intelligence community, which was virtually written off two years ago.

  The end of the Cold War had brought about a dramatic decline in the fortunes of the former KGB, with the old organisation broken up and spying abroad cut by up to 40%. In an interview with me three years ago, Yevgeni Primakov, the head of the SVR, the former First Chief Directorate of the KGB, offered to stop spying against Britain if the British would agree to cease espionage in Russia — an offer which at the time was seen as a sign of serious weakness. Primakov also promised that journalists would no longer be used as cover for spying abroad and that a new era of international intelligence cooperation had dawned.

  But in the November 1994 issue of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence News, a Russian journal, Primakov makes clear that any kind of ‘no spy’ deal would be ‘impossible’.

  ‘In 1992, I was interviewed by a British journalist who asked me whether Russia was ready to give up espionage against Great Britain if the latter did the same,’ he wrote. ‘In our closely intertwined world the solution of this issue on a bilateral basis is, of course, impossible. Suppose all the countries gave up foreign intelligence? Only then could we negotiate this issue. But frankly speaking, only incorrigible dreamers believe in such a prospect.’

  He also describes the ‘difficult times’ Russia is going through. ‘The economic crisis; unsettled relations between the centre and some regions; the threat of territorial disintegration or, at least, the alienation of some of its parts; resistance to the re-integration processes within the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States; the political imperative for Russia to safeguard its interests as a great power in the international arena; apprehensions that it could join the world community as only a raw materials provider, while other great powers have successfully adopted and are implementing development of high-tech production, all these constitute the specific features of this uneasy period.

  ‘Throughout the entire history of the Russian state, the foreign intelligence service has helped the country overcome difficult periods.’

  Primakov went on to describe the role of a more assertive Russian intelligence service that is little different from the old KGB.

  Several Western intelligence agencies had almost begun to write off the feared secret police but now they appear to be making a comeback. In Germany, Chancellor Helmut Kohl was presented in April 1995 with a list of 165 Russian spies who are active in the country and which the intelligence services want expelled.

  Britain expelled Aleksandr Malikov for spying in January of the same year. Contrary to Primakov’s promise, Malikov was working for the KGB in London under cover as a correspondent for the Ostankino television station. In an interview in January 1995, Grigoriy Rapota, the Deputy Director of the SVR, spelled out the revised policy on using journalists as cover.

  ‘We have made use of those professions which are largely free of restrictions and will do so again. It is another matter that it has to be done sensibly, to an extent dictated by need. Especially in such a delicate field as journalism. We ourselves have no interest in harming the image of our Russian journalists — indeed of representatives of any profession. But we cannot operate without cover. Otherwise we would never get anywhere at all.’

  The SVR has formed a new department known as RT to target foreigners in Russia and Ukraine while the FSB, Russia’s internal security service, declared that foreign intelligence services are trying hard to recruit Russian spies. In May 1995, the FSB announced it had uncovered 22 Russians spying for foreign intelligence services during the previous year. Such rhetoric is designed to enhance the image of Russian intelligence and is identical to the spy fever that was used by the KGB during the Cold War to enhance its political influence in Moscow.

  This new activity is in part because the SVR and the FSB are enjoying unparalleled influence in th
e Yeltsin government. As Yeltin’s influence has declined, so he has been forced to rely on a smaller number of people for counsel. Alone among the traditional Soviet institutions, the former KGB remains in place as kingmaker and supporter.

  Yeltsin has allowed the secret services’ power to grow because he recognises that he probably owes his political survival to their loyalty. It was KGB special forces and not the military who put down the attempted coup two years ago and Yeltsin has repaid that loyalty by signing a new law that gives the intelligence services the kind of legal power to spy inside Russia that did not even exist in Stalin’s time.

  Primakov, the chief of the SVR, is one of Russia’s most experienced apparatchiks to have survived the fall of communism. Now he appears to have taken over Russian foreign policy and Andrei Kozyrev, the foreign minister, has been sidelined.

  In September 1994, Primakov publicly proposed that Russia adopt a new and more aggressive policy towards its neighbours, including re-integrating some of the defence establishments under Moscow’s control. This hard-line speech marked the beginning of a tough Russian foreign policy that was echoed almost word for word two weeks later by Yeltsin in a speech at the United Nations.

  Primakov has been similarly aggressive in setting Russia’s agenda for the conference to renew the Non-Proliferation Treaty which is currently under way in New York.

  Ironically, Russian intelligence is becoming more aggressive at precisely the time Western intelligence services are beginning to cooperate more closely with their old enemy. Both MI5 and MI6 had discussed joint operation with the Russians to combat organised crime and drug-trafficking and MI6’s station chief in Moscow operates openly, as does his SVR equivalent in London.

  Despite such deals, it is clear that Russia, with the backing of a newly resurgent KGB, is moving away from the moderate policies established in the early 1990s. With spies active abroad and at home and with the military intervening in Russia and the near abroad, the bear is once again on the march.

  That said, this is a very different bear from the one that the West confronted during the Cold War and there is little prospect of the Russian intelligence structure returning to the size and influence it enjoyed while the Berlin Wall still divided East and West.

  While the nature of intelligence is undergoing a transformation, which will certainly continue well into the next century, it is already clear that there remains a strong need for spies and the intelligence they can provide. In an uncertain world, intelligence can provide some measure of certainty and, as the threats proliferate, so it is even more important that the assets are in place to meet those threats. But what those assets should be, and how much should be spent on them, are still the subject of intense debate wTithin the intelligence community. What is clear is that further reforms of the way intelligence is gathered and processed in every country are certain. The intelligence professionals recognise this and are trying to create new structures and recruit new people to meet those challenges. However, the changes that are needed will not take place unless both the public and the politicians are sufficiently well informed about the way things currently work to distinguish between substance and evasion. I hope that The New Spies will provide the framework for the debate still to come.

  Acknowledgements

  Daria Antonucci conducted some of the early research and I am grateful for her help. She has now moved on to another position where her experience of the intelligence world should be of considerable assistance.

  Jaimie Seaton, an outstanding researcher, filled in many of the gaps and cheerfully answered all those nagging questions that hit an author just when he thinks he has most of the answers. She also put up with my periodic bouts of frustration with great good humour.

  Steve Flynn, who has done some pioneering work on combating illegal drugs, was generous with his time and his research. Gordon Witkin, a reporter with US News and World Report kindly shared some information on the same subject.

  1 am also very grateful to a number of current and past members of the intelligence community who took the trouble to read the manuscript and offer helpful suggestions that have improved the final version. No intelligence service would wish to be publicly thanked and then blamed for the errors and omissions which remain and so I merely acknowledge their assistance and they have my thanks.

  Delivery of this book was delayed by a month while I coped with the arrival of a new daughter, Grace, a sister to Ella. My wife, Rene, found the time and the energy to encourage me down the home straight and to read and improve the first draft. As always I am very grateful to her for the support and faith which make it all possible and worthwhile.

  Glossary

  ANO Abu Nidal Organization

  AWAC Airborne Warning and Control Aircraft

  BDA Battle Damage Assessment

  BOX Bundesnachrichtendienst slang for the Security Service

  BW Biological Weapons

  CIA Central Intelligence Agency

  CIO Central Imagery Office

  CIS Commonwealth of Independent States

  CW Chemical Weapons

  DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

  DI Directorate of Intelligence

  DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

  DIS Defence Intelligence Staff (UK)

  DIO Directorate of Operations

  DST Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire

  EI Electronic Intelligence

  FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

  FCS Federal Counterintelligence Service

  GCHQ Government Communications Headquarters

  GRU Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye

  HUMINT Human Intelligence

  IAEA International Atomic Energy Authority

  IBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

  INM Bureau for International Narcotics Matters

  ISA Intelligence Support Activity

  JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

  JIC Joint Intelligence Center (US)

  JSO Joint Intelligence Committee (UK)

  JSO Jamahirva Security Organization

  KGB Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti

  MB Ministerstvo Bezopasnosti

  MoD Ministry of Defence

  MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime

  NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

  NHITC National Human Intelligence Tasking Center

  NIC National Intelligence Council

  NIE National Intelligence Estimate

  NPC Non Proliferation Center

  NPT Non Proliferation Treaty

  NS A National Security Agency

  NSTL National Security Threat List

  ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy

  PFLP-GC Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command

  PLO – Palestine Liberation Organisation

  RUC – Royal Ulster Constabulary

  SAS – Special Air Service

  SEAL – Sea Air Land Team

  SIGINT – Signals Intelligence

  SIS – Secret Intelligence Service

  SNIE – Special Intelligence Estimate

  SS – Security Service

  UNDCP - United Nations Drug Control Program

  Author’s Note

  I first became interested in the world of espionage when researching The Financing of Terror, a book that was published in 1986. The thesis of the book, that terrorists could be more effectively countered if we understood their finances better, caused some interest in the intelligence community. I was invited to talk to the Defense Intelligence Agency and began a series of lectures to the British Special Branch and met with senior British intelligence officials. Later books, which dealt with covert warfare, the arms business and terrorism, expanded my knowledge of the intelligence community.

  In addition, ten years as the defence correspondent of The Sunday Times brought me into frequent contact with both military and civilian intelligence agencies all over the world. I covered both the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War as well as a number of guerrilla wars and terrorist campaigns and so had ample opportunity to see both the effectiveness of good intelligence and the consequences of shoddy work.